Just saw this rather interesting piece by Tao Wenzhao in the China Daily, Jan. 17. Very dispassionate and intelligent, and it’s nice to see the calm third-party perspective. He holds no brief for the forces tearing Iraq apart, but doesn’t think the US has much chance of doing anything about it.
Filed under: Vietnam
Fred Barnes is still peddling the nonsense.
There’s almost no point arguing with these people; anyone who at this stage still buys the lie that US counterinsurgency worked in Vietnam, and that we would have won the war if not for the Congressional decision to cut off supplemental funding in early 1975, is simply impenetrable to reason. But if this vengeful fantasy appeals to you, here is my article in the Boston Globe on this subject, from December, 2005.
UPDATE: Here’s a photo of one of the people I interviewed in my article, General Le Ngoc Hien, who was in charge of compiling the war plan for the NVA and the Viet Cong during the Tet Offensive and afterwards. In other words, one of the guys who actually did win the Vietnam War.
Gen. Le Ngoc Hien displays a photo of himself with the People’s Army of Vietnam’s general staff in the late 1960s. December, 2005.
Filed under: Law
Ilya Somin notes that some scholars opposed to an originalist intent stance on the Constitution claim that such a stance renders the Air Force unconstitutional. (The Constitution provides for an Army and a Navy, not an Air Force.) He thinks this is a straw-man argument.
Even under the “specific intent” originalism discussed by Chemerinksy, the Air Force would be constitutional so long as the Framers intended (as they almost surely did) to allow the power to raise and regulate the Army and Navy to encompass weapons technologies unknown in their own day.
I see your straw man, Ilya, and raise you a begged question. How do you know the Framers intended that power to encompass weapons technologies unknown in their day? If you can make inferential leaps about what you think the Framers must have intended to encompass in the altered world of the future, why can’t everybody else? What if I feel sure the Framers would have intended for Congress to have the power to regulate the standards of high-definition DVDs, for the public good?
Once we grant such extrapolations, we’re no longer in the realm of “original intent” at all. If this is a straw man, it’s one that tap-dances, moonwalks, and does a pretty good rendition of “He’s the Wizard”.
Filed under: Economics
From the General Motors Co.’s cartoon version of Friedrich Hayek’s “The Road to Serfdom”, circa 1950:
Universal health insurance is only the start. Their true agenda is nothing less than the destruction of our precious nine-irons.
Via Ezra Klein.
In a miniature version of the troop increase that the United States hopes will secure the city, American soldiers and armored vehicles raced onto Haifa Street before dawn to dislodge Sunni insurgents and Shiite militias who have been battling for a stretch of ragged slums and mostly abandoned high rises. But as the sun rose, many of the Iraqi Army units who were supposed to do the actual searches of the buildings did not arrive on time, forcing the Americans to start the job on their own.
When the Iraqi units finally did show up, it was with the air of a class outing, cheering and laughing as the Americans blew locks off doors with shotguns….
…Many of the Iraqi units that showed up late never seemed to take the task seriously, searching haphazardly, breaking dishes and rifling through personal CD collections in the apartments. Eventually the Americans realized that the Iraqis were searching no more than half of the apartments; at one point the Iraqis completely disappeared, leaving the American unit working with them flabbergasted.
“Where did they go?” yelled Sgt. Jeri A. Gillett. Another soldier suggested, “I say we just let them go and we do this ourselves.”
— James Glanz and Damien Cave, “In a New Joint U.S.-Iraqi Patrol, the Americans Go First”, The New York Times, Jan. 25 2007
Nearly every adviser I spoke to agreed that the reasons that “our” Vietnamese did not yet fight as well as the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese could be summed up in two words: “leadership” and “motivation”.
It is difficult to find a single improvement in these areas since the Tet offensive supposedly led the Saigon Government “to realize that we weren’t going to win the war for it and finally pull up its socks,” to quote the official American cheering section, for whom patriotism and optimism have always been synonymous in Vietnam.
— Tom Buckley, “The ARVN Is Bigger and Better, But — “, The New York Times, Oct. 12 1969
Lt. General (Ret.) William E. Odom testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Jan. 18, and offered some of the most comprehensive and resounding analyses of the failures of the war in Iraq that I’ve seen to date. Crucially, he recognizes that the idea that the US can train Iraqi troops to “stand up” as we “stand down” is a chimera. “The problem is not the competency of Iraqi forces,” he says. “It is political consolidation and gaining the troops’ loyalties to the government and their commanders as opposed to their loyalties to sectarian leaders, clans, families, and relatives.” There is no way for the US to make such a transition occur, Odom says; the Iraqi government is weak, and Iraqis quite sensibly place their confidence in their own clan and sectarian militias instead. And Odom’s understanding of this insoluble problem comes from having drawn all the right conclusions from his experiences in Vietnam:
As a military planner working on the pacification programs in 1970-71 in Vietnam, I had the chance to judge the results of training both regular South Vietnamese forces and so-called “regional” and “popular” forces. Some were technically proficient, but that did not ensure that they would always fight for the government in Saigon. Nor were they always loyal to their commanders. And they occasionally fought each other when bribed by Viet Cong agents to do so. The “popular forces” at the village level often failed to protect their villages. The reasons varied, but in several cases it was the result of how their salaries were funded. Local tax money was not the source of their pay; rather it was US-supplied funds. Thus these troops, as well as “regional forces,” had little sense of obligation to protect villagers in their areas of responsibility. For anyone who doubts that the Vietnam case is instructive for understanding the Iraqi case, I recommend Ahmed S. Hashim’s recent book, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq. A fluent Arab linguist and a reserve US Army colonel, who has served a year in Iraq and visited it several other times, Hashim offers a textured study that struck me again and again as a rerun of an old movie, especially where it concerned US training of Iraqi forces.
“A rerun of an old movie.” Yes. Or perhaps a remake.
Filed under: Vietnam
In honor of Prime Minister Dung’s meeting Thursday with the Pope in the Vatican, I decided to celebrate by posting a picture of some young Catholics doing what they do best: badminton.
St. Joseph’s Cathedral, Hanoi, Jan. 25 2007.